An imperfect competition model of the U.S. milk market is developed for analyzing the impacts of dairy policy deregulation. Estimated degree-or-competition parameters indicate that the U.S. milk market has become more competitive over time. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated by showing the relative differences of dynamic simulation results of the imperfect competition model with the results of a conventional exogenous fluid differential model.
fluid differential is actually not exogenous because, in addition to the premiums associated with the federal minimum prices, there are over-order payments resulting from negotiations 2 between dairy cooperatives and processors (or manufacturers).3 Most previous models have not accounted for over-order payments. An imperfect competition model with an endogenous fluid price differential is necessary for estimating how large the fluid price differential might be without existing regulations.
While imperfect competition models of the Japanese milk market have been developed by Suzuki, Lenz, and Forker; and Suzuki et aI., there have been no imperfect competition models developed for the U.S. milk market 4 The purpose of this paper is to present an imperfect competition model with an endogenous fluid price differential to evaluate the market effects of deregulating the U.S . dairy industry . The usefulness of the model is demonstrated by comparing the results of dynamic price paid fo r manufacturing grade (Grade B) milk by manu fac turing plants in Minnesota and Wisconsin . Grade B milk is now a very small ponion of the national market (approximately 6%) , although it is still used to set M-W prices. simulations of this model with the results of a conventional exogenous fluid differential model.
In this study we estimate the effective fluid price (the M-W price + the minimum fluid price differential + any over-order payment) to measure the degree of competition in the U. S. milk market, and incorporate a degree-of-competition measure into the U.S. dairy policy model. The degree-ofcompetition measure based on the effective fluid price differential (the minimum fluid price differential + any over-order payment) is considered an aggregate indicator of the degree of imperfection created by federal policies, and market power of cooperatives and processors and manufacturers in the U. S. milk market. While over-order payments exist not only for Class I milk, but also for Class II and 1II milk, over-order payments for Class II and ill milk are all included in the fluid differential in this analysis because of data limitation .
Theoretical Model
To measure the degree of imperfection, a perfectly competitive market is defined as a basis of comparison. One would expect a relatively unifonn manufacturing milk price nationwide. According to Robinson, "Class II or manufacturing milk prices are approximately the same in all markets and are linked to the M-W price. Uniform pricing of manufacturing milk is necessary because products derived from surplus milk are easily transported between regions. Cheese, butter, and skim-milk powder produced in federal-order markets must compete with similar products manufactured from grade B milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Handlers operating in federalorder markets will not purchase surplus milk if it is priced higher than what unregulated plants pay for manufacturing milk in the Midwest. " (Robinson, p. 116) Without cooperative market power and revenue pooling, individual farmers would compete with each other until the price difference between fluid and manufacturing milk would disappear except for modest locational differences. If a market did not have enough milk to meet local fluid uses, there would be some locational or transportation differentials paid for fluid milk even without marketing orders and cooperatives because fluid plants would have to transport milk from further distances. Fluid plants tend to be located near population centers, while manufacturing plants tend to
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be located near fanns because dairy products are less bulky to ship than raw or fluid milk. We do not consider such possibilities in the current analysis because the number of deficit areas and the magnitude of fluid differentials in a perfectly competitive market is difficult to predict. 5 Several previous studies, which tried to estimate welfare losses caused by marketing orders, also assumed no differentials as a benchmark for comparison (Buxton; Dahlgran; Ippolito and Masson; Masson and Eisenstat) .
If one specifies that, under imperfect competition, the role of dairy cooperatives is to allocate their raw milk supply to fluid and manufacturing markets so as to maximize total milk sales revenues, the first order condition is to equate marginal revenues from fluid and manufacturing milk. When cooperatives undertake processing themselves, manufacturing costs should be taken into account. For simplicity, our current model does not incorporate these costs. Under perfect competition, the first order condition is expressed as:
where P j is fluid milk price , Pm is manufacturing milk price.
At the opposite extreme, the first order condition for monopoly or collusion is:
where Ej = l(aQ/aPj) . (P/Qj) I and Em = l(aQml aP m ) . (P mlQm)1 are price elasticities of fluid and manufacturing milk demand in absolute value tenns; Q j is the aggregate quantity of fluid milk demand; and Qm is the aggregate quantity of manufacturing milk demand.
To express an intennediate degree of imperfect competition, a degree-of-competition parameter, e (0 :::; e :::; 1), is introduced. Then, equality across markets of "perceived" marginal revenue is expressed as:
The parameter e is considered an aggregate indicator of the degree of competition in the milk market. Marginal milk production costs do not enter , McDowell. Fleming . and Spinelli looked al differenlials Ihal would be oblained in differenl markets under a mulliple base poinl pricing syslem . equation (3) or (4) because milk production is almost never controlled by cooperatives , but rather it is detennined by individual fanners' response to blend prices they receive.
Although the degree of competition parameter is specified by cooperatives' revenue maximizing behavior, it is also affected by the countervailing power of processors and manufacturers. Therefore, it should be noted that the degree-ofcompetition parameter reflects both cooperatives' and processors' and manufacturers' market power. We do not have a way to explicitly incorporate processor's and manufacturers' oligopsonistic power into the current model.
If 8 can be assumed to be the same for both fluid and manufacturing markets, one can identify a value of 8 which satisfies equation (3) or (4), with values of milk price elasticities estimated by demand functions and observations of PJ' Pm' QJ, and Qm. However, 8 m will probably be lower than 8 J because cooperatives face more competition in the manufacturing milk market than in the fluid milk market. Fluid milk products are costlier to transport than manufactured milk products, and, therefore, the geographical scope of markets for manufactured milk products in general will exceed that for fluid milk products. Since there likely is more competition in the manufactured product market than in the fluid market, the manufacturing milk market is probably more competitive.
Instead of deriving 8 with the assumption that 8 J = 8 m by estimating both fluid and manufacturing demand equations, one could estimate the fluid (or manufacturing) demand equation and equation (3) or (4) into which the manufacturing (or fluid) demand equation is substituted. The parameter, 8 , is directly estimated as a coefficient of (3) or (4) using this method (Bresnahan) , and 8 J and 8 m can be separately identified. However, the coefficients for the manufacturing (or fluid) demand equation cannot be identified (See Appendix).
The solution to this problem adopted here is to assume that 8 m = 0 and then solve for 8 J . The assumption that 8 m = 0 is plausible because the manufacturing milk price for each market is given as the M-W price, and the M-W price is indirectly supported by government purchases of dairy products. We do not consider the fact that some orders such as Chicago obtain significant over-order Class III payments (Babb) 
or
The full imperfect competition model is expressed as:
Milk production:
Manufacturing milk demand:
Milk sales maximizing allocation:
Milk uses identity:
Blend price:
where Q is aggregate milk production, BP is the blend price, and FUSE is on-farm use of milk produced (assumed to be exogenous), with all other variables as previously defined . The other exogenous variables (feed price, income, advertising expenditures , and trend) are not included in the above simplified expressions. With six endogenous variables (Q, QJ' Qm, PJ' Pm ' BP) and six equations, the model is complete. Because this model expresses fanners' supply, and processors ' and manufacturers' demand for raw milk, government purchases of dairy products and changes in commercial inventories are not treated separatel y, i.e., manufacturing milk demand (Qm) includes commercial manufacturing demand, government purchases of dairy products, and changes in commercial inventories on a milk-equivalent basis.
Empirical Model Estimation

6
Over-Order Payment Data
The effective fluid milk price is equal to the M-W price plus the minimum Class I differential plus any over-order payments . Since the only available data on over-order payments pertain to "announced" over-order payments in 35 markets by the USDA, it is difficult to collect the over-order payment data for all cooperatives over time and to construct a national average . time-series data set. Instead, the effective fluid milk price (P f ) is estimated by solving the blend price equation for Pi
The difference between the Class II and ill prices is minor and neglected like most previous models . However, since over-order payments exist not only for Class I milk, but also for Class II and III milk, equation (13) assigns the over-order payments for Class II and III milk to the fluid differential. Consequently , the estimated effective fluid prices may be higher than the actual ones because they include all premiums over the M-W price . To check the possible bias of using the estimates from equation (13), the estimated prices are compared with simple annual average values of "announced" cooperative Class I prices in 35 markets reported by the USDA. As shown in table 1, the estimated effective prices are larger than the cooperative prices in many years as is expected, but the differences are relatively small , and in some recent years the announced cooperative prices are slightly higher. This comparison implies that over-order premiums for Class il and 1II milk are not large on average, and, therefore, the effective fluid prices estimated by equation (13) probably does not generate a serious bias in estimating the degree-of-competition parameter. The blend price is the all milk price reported by the USDA which includes over-order payments. The differences between the estimated effective fluid milk price and the minimum Class I price are shown in Figure 1 . The effective prices are higher than the minimum prices in almost all years, indicating the existence of over-order payments. Figure I implies that most previous models had internal data inconsistency because they used the minimum Class I price and the all milk price .
Supply Function
The aggregate milk supply (Q) is estimated using quarterly data from 1975 through 1990 as a function of the current and lagged milk-feed price ratio (MF = blend price/feed price), time trend A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to account for lagged effects of the milk-feed price ratio .? Among many alternative forms, the second degree pOlynomial distributed lag with both endpoints constrained to lie close to zero and a six quarter lag provided the best results. This lag length seems reasonable considering the biological reproduction cycle of dairy cows.
The estimated long run price elasticity of milk supply is 0.224, which is similar to Chavas and 
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Fluid Milk Demand Function
The fluid milk demand function is the processors' "derived" demand for raw milk. A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to account for lagged generic fluid advertising effects. The second degree polynomial distributed lag with botb endpoints constrained to lie close to zero and a five quarter lag provided the best results. The effects are largest four to six months later, and erode in about a year. No lagged effects of branded fluid advertising were found to be significant, but the current effect was significant.
Calculated at mean data points, the estimated elasticities of fluid demand with respect to price, income, and branded fluid advertising are The fluid demand function was estimated using a linear form because other functional forms (double-log, semi-log, log-inverse, and inverse) resulted in negative marginal revenue estimates and 'were rejected because negative fluid milk marginal revenue precludes discussion of the collusion case expressed by equation (2).9 TSLS was used to estimate this equation because both quantity and price are endogenous in the model.
Manufacturing Milk Demand Function
Because this is the manufacturers' "derived" demand for raw milk, government purchases of dairy products and changes in commercial inventories are not treated separately . Per capita manufacturing milk demand (Qm/N) was estimated as a function of the manufacturing milk price (Pm) deflated by the CPI, per capita income (INC) deflated by the CPl, the ratio of persons under 19 years old to the total population (A U 19), current and lagged manufacturing milk advertising expenditures (branded manufactured product -BAm' and generic manufactured product -GAm), intercept dummy variables for the DTP and MDP, and harmonic seasonality variables (SIN I, COS], and COS2).
The DTP and MDP were included in this de- 9 The manufacturing demand function is also estimated using a linear form to be consistent with the fluid demand function. mand function because this derived demand includes government purchases of dairy products as well as commercial use. Since these two programs significantly affected the government component of manufacturer demand, they are included in this equation. The federal dairy price support program is considered in this equation in that the manufacturing milk price (Pm = M-W price) is indirectly supported tlrrough government purchases of dairy products. Intercept dummy variables are also included for the fourth quarters of 1989 and 1990 because regression residuals for both periods are very large. The outlier for the fourth quarter of 1989 is likely due to the unusually strong demand for nonfat dry milk during that quarter, but we have no explanation for the fourth quarter 1990 outlier. La A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to account for lagged branded manufacturing advertis-10 Inventory building by cheese wholesalers and manufacrurers in the face of uncenainties in milk supply could be another factor to explain unprecedented increases in M-W prices .
ing effects. The second degree polynomial distributed lag with both endpoints constrained to lie close to zero and a three quarter lag provided the best results. We could not estimate any significant effects of generic manufacturing advertising (a negative coefficient with very small t-value is found). The variable, AU19, and the intercept dummy variable for the MDP were also not significant. Consequently, these variables were dropped from the model. The estimated coefficient on the income variable is negative and significant, which is not consistent with expectations. Because each dairy product has a very different demand trend and structure, disaggregated estimation would likely produce better results, however, this is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
Calculated at mean data points, the estimated elasticities of manufacturing demand with respect to price and long run branded advertising are 1,0, -1,0) , the first wave of the cosine function (0, -I, 0, I), and the second wave of the cosine function ( -I, J, -I, I), respectively.
(I, 0, -J, 0) etc. are values for each quarter, where the first quarter means TII2, second TI, third 3TI/2, and fourth 2TI, lagged residual, fluid milk marketed (billion pounds), U.S. population (million persons), effective Class I price estimated using equation (13) ($/cwt), consumer price index for all items (1982-84 = 100), disposable personal income per capita ($1,000), generic and branded fluid advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index ($1,000), respectively, ratio of persons under J 9 years old to the total population (total = I), manufacturing milk marketed (billion pounds), M-W price ($/cwt), branded manufacturing advertising expenditures (including branded butter advertising, branded ice cream advertising, and branded cheese advertising) deflated by the media price index ($1,000), intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for quarter 4, 1989, 0 otherwise, intercept dummy variable equal to I for quarter 4, 1990, 0 otherwise. both manufacturing demand and price are endogenous in the model. u.s. milk market is neither perfectly competitive nor purely monopolistic. The estimates imply some degree of market imperfection that has been declining over time.
Degree-ai-Competition Parameter
The degree-of-competition parameter is equal to one under monopoly or collusion, and zero under perfect competition or price-taking behavior. As shown in table 4, derived annual average estimates of 8/s using equation (5) or (6) indicate that the Year 1977 Year 1978 Year 1979 Year 1980 Year 1981 Year 1982 Year 1983 Year 1984 Year 1985 Year 1986 Year 1987 Year 1988 Year 1989 Year 1990 Degree-of-Competition Parameter Competitive pressures in the fluid market have increased over time due to improvements in transportation technology and increasing reserves of milk in areas other than the Minnesota and Wisconsin. Dairy farmers have tried to reduce the competitive pressures by merging cooperatives and milk marketing orders while size of manufacturing plants have become larger. The gradually decreasing degree-of-competition parameters could be the consequences of a power balance caused by these developments.
Simulations
To determine the validity of the estimated model for analyses of deregulation, values for the endogenous variables, given the values for the exogenous variables, were determined in a fully dynamic simulation by the Gauss-Seidel technique! I for the historical period 1980--90. As illustrated by the II This is a numerical technique used in the TSP-Micro econometric software. It is similar to the Newton and the Fletcher-Powell methods, but is more powerful in deating with large models that have block components. It is unclear how deregulation might be implemented. Because our focal point is to examine the relative differences between model results, we do not consider any gradual deregulation following some time schedule.
For simulating cases without import quotas where the manufacturing milk market is open to foreign imports, the manufacturing milk price (Pm) in equation (10) is interpreted as a given imported product price measured on a milk-fat equivalent basis. It is assumed that farmers would consider the demand for manufacturing milk to be perfectly elastic at the import product (world) price. Because the model is a single-country model, we cannot determine the import product price level after elimination of import quotas endogenously by solving a multi-country model such as the Ministerial Trade Mandate (MTM) model of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and USDA's SWOPSIM (OECD; Roningen). Because our focal point is to examine the differences between two model results, we assume a 20% decline from the current Pm level for each year as an example.
In addition, Qm is replaced by QMi (total manufacturing milk demand including dairy imports in milk equivalents) in (9), i.e.:
Also, the following definitional identity for imports is added: (15) where Q, is dairy imports on a milk-fat equivalent basis. 12 The fonnula is (I/II)L\(P -A)/A\ x 100, where P is the predicted value and A is the actual value .
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The imperfect competition model for simulation in the case where there are no price supports, no import quotas, and no marketing orders is:
Exogenous Fluid Differential Model
The difference between the current imperfect competition model and the conventional exogenous fluid differential model is found in equation (19). The imperfect competition model is transformed to the exogenous fluid differential model used in most previous analyses by replacing equation (19) with:
where DIFF is the exogenous fluid price differential. It should be noted that DIFF is not the minimum Class I differential, but the effective fluid differential treated as an exogenous variable.
Comparison of Simulation Results
We used historical time periods for our simulations to avoid having to estimate the future values for exogenous variables. The dynamic simulation results, from 1980 to 1990, are shown in table 6.
Comparison of the two models illustrates how the imperfect competition model yields different estimates of deregulation effects from the results of the conventional exogenous fluid differential model. The differences in results between the imperfect competition and exogenous fluid differential models tend to be rather small. For instance, results of the imperfect competition model show that, compared to the current level,13 the fluid milk price would be 15 .2% lower on an average for the simulation period, the blend price would be 17.2% lower, and milk production would be 4 .2% smaller. Results of the exogenous fluid differential model show that the fluid milk price would be 16. 1 % lower on an average for the simulation period, the blend price would be 17.6% lower, and milk production would be 4.3% smaller.
In the imperfect competition model, ap jaP m is expressed by Therefore, the exogenous fluid differential model tends to overestimate the negative effects of deregulation compared to the imperfect competition model, but the differences are relatively small . As equation (24) shows, the larger Sf is, the smaller ap jap m. In other words, more fluid market imperfection could cause less direct translation of decreases in the manufacturing price into decreases in the fluid price .
Summary and Conclusions
The effective fluid price differential (the minimum differential plus any over-order payment) is considered to reflect the degree of competition in the U.S. milk market. An imperfect competition model with the fluid price differential endogenously explained by the degree of competitiveness is theoretically preferred to the exogenous fluid differential model because the fluid price differential is not exogenous due to over-order payments. This paper presented the first imperfect competition model with an endogenous fluid differential for the U. S. dai ry market usi ng degree-ofcompetition parameter estimates. The estimated parameters imply that there is some degree of im- 13 The current values are not observations but values solved by fully dynamic simulation of equations (7) to ( 12). perfection in the U.S. milk market , which has been declining over time. Competitive pressures in the fluid market have increased over time due to improvements in transportation technology and increasing reserves of milk in areas other than the Minnesota and Wisconsin. Dairy farmers have tried to reduce the competitive pressures by merging cooperatives and milk marketing orders while size of manufacturing plants have become larger. The gradually decreasing degree-of-competition parameters could be the consequences of a balance of power due to these developments.
The usefulness of the model was demonstrated by showing the relative differences of dynamic simulation results of the imperfect competition model with the results of an exogenous fluid differential model.
Because it is uncertain whether or not the current degree of market competition would remain unchanged after deregulation, we cannot determine that the imperfect competition model provides more likely estimates of key milk market parameters after deregulation than the exogenous fluid differential model. At a minimum , the exogenous fluid differential model tends to overestimate the negative effects of deregulation compared to the imperfect competition model, if the current degree of competiti veness in the U. S. milk market is maintained after deregulation. Decreases in the manufacturing milk price exactly correspond to decreases in the fluid milk price in the exogenous fluid differential model. However, some market imperfection could cause less direct translation of decreases in the manufacturing price into decreases in the fluid price.
Our simulation results show that the effects of deregulation are indeed larger with the exogenous fluid price differential model than with the imperfect competition model, but the differences are relatively small. This provides some justification for using the exogenous fluid price differential model as a simplifying, but acceptable alternative. There is a trade-off between realism and tractability in model building. If the losses associated with simplifying assumptions are small, it is often beneficial to make them and then concentrate on the parameters that impact the analysis most significantly. Since the degree of competition parameter has been declining in the U.S. dairy industry, researchers may not be guilty of a capital offense by treating the fluid differential as exogenous in some cases.
The model presented in this paper is a basic framework, and improvements in its shortcomings would be valuable in future research. In particular, processors' and manufacturers' market power is not explicitly incorporated into the current model, and over-order payments for Class II and III milk are aggregated in the effective fluid differential. Also, cooperatives with manufacturing plants are not considered, which is a characteristic of the U.S. dairy market that does in fact exist to an important degree.
Appendix
An Alternative Solution
For simplicity, fluid and manufacturing demand equations are specified as follows:
(AI) CA2) QJ = a + bPJ Qm = c + dP", Then, equality across markets of "perceived" marginal revenue is: (A3) P J + e J · QJb = Pm + e", . Qm1d
In this paper, we attempted to estimate 6' s from (A3) using estimates of (A I) and (A2).
Alternatively, substituting (A2) into (A3) yields;
P J = -eJb' QJ + (I + em)P", + em . cld If (AI) and (A4) are estimated without estimating (A2), both e J and em are identified, but c and d cannot be identified separately.
